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Abstract 
This paper aims at situating the policy discourse accompanying current European Union (EU) initiatives 
on facilitating access by public authorities to data held by private companies, including in scenarios 
regarded as crossing jurisdictional borders. More concretely, it contextualises these initiatives in light of 
the absence of publicly available statistical information on some of the issues which are at the very core 
of these matters.  
Firstly, the paper presents the three main current developments, that is, the proposed ‘E-evidence 
package’, the negotiation of an EU-United States (US) agreement facilitating access to e-evidence for 
the purpose of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and the participation of the EU in the 
negotiations in the Council of Europe on a second additional protocol to the Cybercrime Convention, 
analysing some of the recurrent messages associated with defending the necessity of all these different 
measures. The Brief then reviews some of the information upon which are being constructed arguments 
used to purport the need for these developments, by granting particular attention to the Impact 
Assessment that accompanied the publication of the ‘E-evidence package’. Finally, it suggests that the 
absence of statistical data might have implications for the assessment of the proportionality of eventual 
legislative measures. 
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Introduction  
The European Union (EU) is currently engaged in a number of developments aimed at 
facilitating the access by public authorities to personal data held by private companies, for the 
purpose of serving as evidence in criminal proceedings. In line with these developments, the 
access to data should ultimately be rendered possible, whenever necessary, regardless of the 
eventual crossing of jurisdictional borders – be it borders between different Member States, or 
between the EU and certain third countries. Current developments are indeed based on the 
general premise that crime does not stop at borders between countries, and that, therefore, 
shall be facilitated the access by public authorities to any data useful in the context of criminal 
proceedings, also across borders. 
This Policy Brief provides a descriptive overview of the instruments on the table, giving 
particular attention to the question of how their necessity is being presented, and the publicly 
available evidence used to support such necessity. It first introduces the instruments, pointing 
out some of their interconnections, but also their disparate legal implications, as well as 
commenting the argumentation surrounding them. The paper later moves to discussing more 
in detail the Impact Assessment that accompanied the publication of the ‘E-evidence package’ 
made public by the European Commission in 2018. 
1. Three initiatives and a leitmotif 
Ongoing policy discussions at EU level in relation to cross-border access to evidence concern 
mainly three elements. First, there is the so-called ‘E-evidence package’, referring to both a 
proposal for a Regulation on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic 
evidence in criminal matters,1 and a proposal for a Proposal for a Directive laying down 
harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering 
evidence in criminal proceedings.2 These two texts were made public by the European 
Commission in April of 2018; the Council reached a position on the proposed Regulation in 
December 2018,3 and on the proposed Directive in March 2019.4 
These proposals are intended, in particular, to facilitate access to e-evidence by enabling 
judicial orders emanating from one Member State to be addressed directly to service providers 
based in another Member State. They also aim, inter alia, at avoiding fragmentation in the EU, 
 
1 European Commission (2018), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters, COM(2018) 225 final, 
Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
2 European Commission (2018), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down 
harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal 
proceedings, COM(2018) 226 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
3 And supplemented by the respective annexes to that proposal as agreed by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) 
at its meeting on 6 June 2019: Council of the EU (2019), General approach to Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on European production and preservation orders for electronic evidence in criminal 
matters, 10206/19, 11.6.2019. 
4 Council of the EU (2019), General approach to Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering 
evidence in criminal proceedings, 6946/19, Brussels, 28.2.2019, adopted on 8 March 2019. 
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which could be created by disparate national requirements imposed on service providers, 
including non-EU providers, in relation to measures concerning requests for data – for instance, 
referring to the need to have a legal representative within the territory of the Member State. 
To this purpose, the proposed Directive regulates the appointment of service providers' legal 
representatives, entrusted with receive and responding to orders requesting data, for non-EU 
service providers providing services within the EU: shall be obliged to designate a legal 
representative all service providers that offer services in the EU, meaning in one or more 
Member States. The mere accessibility of an online interface, taken in isolation, shall not be a 
sufficient condition to trigger this obligation. What would matter are the existence of a 
substantial connection with one or more Member States, or specific factual criteria such as a 
significant number of users in one or more Member States, or the targeting of activities towards 
one or more Member States. 
Second, the Council of the EU mandated the European Commission to negotiate on behalf of 
EU  with a view to concluding an agreement between the EU and the US on cross-border access 
by judicial authorities in criminal proceedings to electronic evidence held by a service provider,5 
based on a Recommendation put forward by the European Commission in February 2019.6 This 
Agreement should notably reduce the problems of conflicts of law potentially affecting US 
service providers which might need to comply with future E-evidence rules, in particular in the 
cases where they might receive their legal representative in the EU, a data request in the form 
of a European Production Order (EPO). In doing so, it would be instrumental for the 
effectiveness of EPOs, as the largest service providers are headquartered in the US.7 
Third, the Council also mandated the European Commission to participate in the negotiations 
in the Council of Europe on a Second Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention (known 
as the Budapest Convention), again based on a Recommendation put forward by the 
Commission in February 2019.8 This Second Additional Protocol, which is under discussion at 
the Council of Europe since 2017, would lay down rules allowing for direct requests for data to 
be sent to service providers in other states parties to the Convention. Currently, 63 countries 
are party this Convention: 26 are EU Member States and thus share, notably, the same data 
protection standards, while the majority are not. Countries include the US, as well as Turkey, 
 
5 Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement between the 
European Union and the United States of America on cross-border access to electronic evidence for judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, Brussels, 21.5.2019. 
6 European Commission (2019), Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations in 
view of an agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on cross-border access to 
electronic evidence for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, COM(2019) 70 final, Brussels, 5.2.2019. 
7 In this sense: European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) (2019), Opinion on the negotiating mandate of an EU-
US agreement on cross-border access to electronic evidence, Opinion 2/2019, 2.4.2019, p. 6. 
8 European Commission (2019), Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the participation in 
negotiations on a second Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (CETS No. 185), 
COM(2019) 71 final, Brussels, 5.2.2019. 
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Russia, Canada, Israel, and Nigeria, to name a few examples illustrating its broad geographical 
scope.  
These three elements currently on the table of EU decision-makers are, as already hinted, 
interconnected at a number of levels. They all mirror a parallel concern with tackling a 
perceived inadequacy of existing legal channels for public authorities to obtain access to data 
in the hands of service providers, these data being really at the centre of policy attention.  
2. Three different sets of legal implications 
The three described, elements, however, do also have different legal implications, especially in 
terms of impact on EU fundamental rights. They would indeed have different, incremental 
effects on accessibility of personal data processed under EU law. 
The E-evidence package targets, as such, the access by public authorities to data in the hands 
of service providers operating in the EU. In this context, the ‘cross-border’ dimension of this 
package refers first and foremost to the fact that the authority and the service provider might 
not be based in the same Member State: the request might thus ‘cross a border’ that until now 
prototypically requires going through a contact with another public authority on the other side 
of the border. In doing so, what this package does is multiply the possibilities for service 
providers to be directly contacted by a public authority seeking access to the data they process. 
Service providers could be potentially directly addressed by any competent authority from any 
Member State, and not only, for instance, the one where they are based, or where they 
predominantly deliver services, or where they store their data. 
The E-evidence package’s implications, however, go actually beyond that, as the rules under 
discussion would generally oblige certain third-country service providers to designate a legal 
representative in the EU, who would have to fulfil request for data presented by competent 
authorities of EU Member States. This means that data that could arguably be ‘at the other 
side’ of the jurisdictional border would be in way re-located under the jurisdictional reach of 
EU competent authorities.  
The possible future EU-US Agreement should, according to the Council, “[a]ddress conflicts of 
law and set common rules for orders for obtaining electronic evidence, in the form of content 
and non-content data, from a judicial authority in one contracting party, addressed to a service 
provider that is subject to the law of the other contracting party”. 9 In line with the mandate to 
negotiate an EU-US Agreement, the instrument “should create reciprocal rights and obligations 
of the parties”.10 
 
9 Council of the EU (2019), Addendum to the Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of 
negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement between the European Union and the United States of 
America on cross-border access to electronic evidence for judicial cooperation in criminal matters - adoption, 
Brussels, 27.5.2019, p. 3. 
10 Ibid., p. 4. 
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This reciprocity principle is of the greatest importance, as it implies that increased, faster access 
to data by European public authorities is to be obtained only on the condition that an 
‘equivalent’ access to data held by EU service providers is guaranteed to US public authorities. 
In doing so, this Agreement would thus in a way move data from under EU law to the reach of 
US authorities, redrawing the boundaries of their reach. 
The future EU-US Agreement would, in the bilateral relations between the EU and the US, take 
precedence over the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime and any agreement or 
arrangement reached in the negotiations of the Second Additional Protocol to the Council of 
Europe Convention on Cybercrime, in so far as the provisions of the latter agreement or 
arrangement cover issues dealt with by the EU-US Agreement.11 
The implications of the discussed Second Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime would be rather global in nature, potentially allowing EU competent 
authorities to ‘cross’ a significant number of borders in their quest for data, while, at the same 
time, putting data protected under EU law within the reach of a significant number of third 
countries.   
3. More, faster, smoother 
The need for new instruments in the area of ‘cross-border’ access to data is typically connected 
in EU policy documents to a variety of arguments, among which might be described three main 
groups: those concerned with the need to obtain access to certain data presumably 
inaccessible (that is, to reach more data), those related to accelerating the process of accessing 
such data (thus, to reach them faster), and those generally linked with facilitating and reducing 
any possible obstacles to the whole endeavour (to reach the data in a less cumbersome 
manner). 
It is worth being underlined that discussions have regularly centred on granting increased, 
quicker, and more direct access to data in relation to all types of crimes, as opposed to 
regulating merely criminal proceedings related to certain categories of crimes such as, for 
instance, ‘cybercrimes’. Documents typically stress that e-evidence is increasingly of 
significance in all criminal proceedings – at least to the extent that there is e-evidence related 
to the proceedings at stake. As somehow tautologically stated by the Council: “The collection, 
analysis and usage of e-evidence is increasingly relevant in criminal proceedings, not only in 
relation to cybercrime, but also in relation to any other offence that may involve e-evidence”.12  
 
11 Ibid., p. 5. 
12 Council of the EU (2017), Final report of the seventh round of mutual evaluations on "The practical 
implementation and operation of the European policies on prevention and combating cybercrime", ST 12711 2017 
INIT, Brussels, 2.10.2017, p. 45. 
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3.1 More 
The idea that nowadays some data remains inappropriately out of reach for EU competent 
authorities to access them and allow for their use in criminal proceedings concerns mainly 
certain categories of data, and, specifically, ‘content data’, in the sense of data related to the 
content of electronic communications.  
More specifically, this limitation crucially concerns US service provides, which are currently 
allowed by US law to disclose some data to public authorities of foreign countries, but not 
content data. The legal situation of requests for content data submitted to US services 
providers might be changed under the US Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act,13 
if qualifying foreign governments would conclude an executive agreement with the US to allow 
for the fulfilment of these requests when emanating from certain foreign countries. It is in the 
context of this specific possibility that needs to be placed the EU-US Agreement under 
negotiation, which would thus not only be instrumental for US service providers to be able to 
fulfil their obligations under the E-evidence package, but also instrumental for them to translate 
into reality the possibilities opened up by the CLOUD Act. 
3.2 Faster 
The presumably problematic slowness of existing procedures has been decried in numerous 
occasions: “the current MLA procedures need to be faster”, stated, for instance, the Council.14 
In some occasions it is unclear exactly to what this comparative refers to: procedures might 
need to be faster in the future than they are in the present, but also, perhaps, faster than data 
being moved by criminals. 
The Impact Assessment accompanying the E-evidence package noted that in the cases in which 
electronic evidence is available only on private infrastructures located outside a country, or 
owned by service providers established outside of such country, or both, “traditional 
mechanisms for cooperation between authorities are slow compared to the fast pace at which 
data can be moved, changed or deleted”15. In these instances, speeding up the access to data 
seems to aim, ultimately, at guaranteeing that the access is faster than the data, which appears 
to be, somehow, escaping from attempts to access it. Because data moves fast away from 
public authorities, public authorities would need to be quicker than such movement: 
“authorities face a race against time to obtain data for their investigation”, as the European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) eloquently wrote.16 
The fundamental question in relation to this is, ultimately, whether the speeding up shall be 
attempted by improving the performance of existing mechanisms, or by proposing alternative 
channels for obtaining access. 
 
13 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act or CLOUD Act (H.R. 4943). 
14 Council of the EU (2017), op. cit., p. 48. 
15 Ibid., p. 5. 
16 EDPS (2019), op. cit., p. 3. 
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3.3 Smoother 
Rendering the whole process of accessing data held by private companies less cumbersome for 
public authorities has been a recurrent concern among EU institutions discussing these 
questions. Sometimes, this facilitation of access goes hand in hand with a call to re-imagine 
existing access paradigms governing international cooperation, which are based in the notion 
of judicial cooperation. Judicial cooperation is at the heart of existing mechanisms such as the 
European Investigation Order,17 the 2000 Mutual Legal Assistance Convention,18 or the 2013 
EU-US Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance.19  
“Cyber criminality requires competent judicial authorities to rethink the way they cooperate 
within their jurisdiction and applicable law to ensure swifter cross-border access to evidence and 
information”, stated the European Commission in 2015.20 Already then, the Commission 
identified as a point for future action a review of the “obstacles to criminal investigations on 
cybercrime, notably on issues of competent jurisdiction and rules on access to evidence and 
information”.21 
Progressively, this re-thinking of cooperation has been shaped along the lines of allowing public 
authorities to request directly to private companies access to data they hold, even when the 
issuance of such a request, or the granting of access to the data, might appear to cross 
jurisdictional border. This, as a matter of fact, goes beyond a re-thinking of the way in which 
judicial authorities cooperate between them, towards a focus on letting public authorities work 
directly with private actors.  
The possibility for public authorities to request the data directly to private companies, also in 
cross-border scenarios, can be described as ‘unmediated access’,22 in the sense that it does not 
rely on the involvement of an authority mediating the submitted request on the other side of 
the border. The European Commission appears to favour the label of ‘direct cooperation’, 
which would be different from ‘judicial cooperation’ but also from ‘direct access’. In this 
 
17 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European 
Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, pp. 1-36. 
18 Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union the 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union, OJ C 
197, 12.7.2000, p. 1 and its Protocol, OJ C 326, 21.11.2001, p. 1-2. 
19 Agreement of 25 June 2003 on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States of 
America, OJ L 181, 19.7.2003, pp. 34-42. 
20 European Commission (2015), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of The Regions: The European Agenda on 
Security, COM(2015) 185 final, Strasbourg, 28.4.2015, p. 20. 
21 Idem. 
22 Sergio Carrera, Gloria González Fuster, Elspeth Guild, and Valsamis Mitsilegas (2015), Access to Electronic Data 
by Third-Country Law Enforcement Authorities. Challenges to EU Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights, CEPS, 
Brussels, p. 9. 
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tripartite division, ‘direct access’ would take place when a public authority actively retrieves 
data from a private company without the latter being requested to cooperate.23 
4. The evidence behind E-Evidence 
In 2017, following a round of mutual evaluations on the prevention and combating cybercrime, 
the Council recommended that the EU and its Member States consider the development of an 
EU framework on law enforcement access to data held by service providers, which “should 
regulate the relations between LEA and ISPs, with clear rules and duties”.24 That round of mutual 
evaluations did gather a considerable of information on national practices related to 
cybercrime, as collected by punctual visits of teams of three national experts in the field.25 
A more specific discussion of information specifically related to e-evidence can be found in the 
Impact Assessment that accompanied the publication of the E-evidence package by the 
European Commission in April 2018. This Impact Assessment draws on a variety of sources, 
including information gathered via the consultation activities that were put in place by the 
European Commission during the preparation of the package. These consultation activities 
notably encompassed meetings, participation to conferences, an open public consultation, and 
a series of ‘targeted surveys’: a total of three surveys of public authorities in Member States, 
one on current practices, a second one on “the size of the problem”, and a third one on costs 
and benefits associated with different options; plus another survey, also on costs and benefits 
associated with the different options, targeting service providers.26 
4.1 Getting to know the unknown 
The Impact Assessment openly concedes that there are important limitations in terms of 
available information on the issue at stake. It notes that “[i]t is not possible to determine exactly 
the number of crimes that cannot be effectively investigated and prosecuted in the EU because 
of challenges in cross-border access to electronic evidence”, explaining that “[d]ata at this level 
of detail is not collected by public authorities”.27 There might be some irony in the fact that 
these public authorities that do not deem the collection data on such matters necessary or 
appropriate correspond, at least partially, to the very same authorities that are eager to 
 
23 Or, as the Impact Assessment accompanying the E-evidence package states “without the help of an 
intermediary” (European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying 
the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production 
and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters and Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the 
purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings, SWD/2018/118 final, Brussels, 17.4.2018, hereafter ‘the 
Impact Assessment’, p. 11). In practice, this notion of “help” might be difficult to assess, as for instance a known 
vulnerability could also be regarded as “help”. 
24 Council of the EU (2017), op. cit., p. 50. 
25 National reports on the evaluations are available here: https://www.coe.int/en/web/octopus/blog/-
/blogs/genval-evalutation-reports-on-cybercrime/.  
26 Impact Assessment, p. 118. 
27 Ibid., p. 13. 
8 | GONZÁLEZ FUSTER & VÁZQUEZ MAYMIR 
 
highlight the need for them to obtain access to more data, faster, in a less cumbersome 
manner, including across the globe.  
The document offers nevertheless some estimations, notably regarding the number of yearly 
judicial cooperation requests, based on available data on the European Arrest Warrant and 
from the European Judicial Network (“it can be estimated that there are around 13,000 
MLA/EIO requests per year on e-evidence between Member States”), and the figures collected 
during the 2016 EU-US MLA Review exercise (“it can be estimated that the outgoing requests 
for e-evidence by EU public authorities to the US authorities amount to approximately 1300 per 
year”). 
4.1.1 Ten months it shall be 
Some of the sources cited in the Impact Assessment are peculiar. In this sense, it proclaims that 
“[t]he MLAT process with the US takes an average of 10 months”, referring in a footnote to a 
blog post by an academic, dated from 2016.28 In such blog post, it is indeed stated that, in 
relation to UK requests to data sent to the US, “[t]his process takes an average of 10 months”, 
an assertion provided without a specific reference as such; previously, the post does refer to 
another post, which similarly refers to “a process that takes an average of 10 months”, again 
without any concrete reference, and to another blog post, from 2015,29 which does directly 
mention the source of such assertion – a 2013 report which stated that “[r]equests appear to 
average approximately 10 months to fulfill, with some requests taking considerably longer”.30 
Such 2013 put forward that statement without any further clarification as to how this exact 
figure had been calculated, and – again ironically, perhaps- did so in an introductory paragraph 
that presented a series of recommendations on how to actually improve mutual legal assistance 
mechanisms, as opposed to dismissing them, or getting rid of them, and this in order to 
“demonstrate the US commitment to a well-functioning Internet that meets the goals of the 
international community”.31 
This recurrent idea of a duration of 10 months is not explicitly contrasted with insights revealed 
through other sources used by the European Commission. The figure below, for instance, is 
presented in the Impact Assessment and would suggest that for the majority of surveyed 
contacts requests for content data to third countries would believe take an average time of up 
to 6 months. 
 
28 Jennifer Daskal (2016), “A New UK-US Data Sharing Agreement: A Tremendous Opportunity, If Done Right”, Just 
Security, February 2016, https://www.justsecurity.org/29203/british-searches-america-tremendous-opportunity/.  
29 David Kris (2015), “Preliminary Thoughts on Cross-Border Data Requests”, Lawfare, September 28, 2015, 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/preliminary-thoughts-cross-border-data-requests.   
30 United States President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, Richard Alan Clarke, 
Michael J. Morell, Geoffrey R. Stone, Cass R. Sunstein, and Peter P. Swire (2013), Liberty and Security in a Changing 
World: Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies, December 2013, p. 227. 
31 Idem. 
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Figure 1. Table from Impact Assessment, p. 263 
 
4.1.2 The persistent opacity of transparency reports 
The European Commission asserts it estimated “the magnitude of the problem” which the E-
evidence package tries to solve primarily using two main sources of information: the survey 
analysed in the following section, and so-called ‘transparency reports’ from the main service 
providers, that is, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter and Apple.32 According to what are 
apparently the European Commission’s own calculations, the market share of these companies 
would allow to ‘estimate’ “that up to 90% of current cross-border requests for non-content data 
are sent to these five providers”.33 
The Impact Assessment notes these transparency reports suffer from important limitations. For 
instance, they do not distinguish whether reported requests came directly from the Member 
State in which it originated, or from an authority which mediated such request, and concern 
“mostly” requests for non-content data.34 
4.2 A survey which proved (also) other matters 
A particularly interesting survey among those conducted by the European Commission in 
preparation for the E-evidence package is the survey of public authorities in Member States on 
“the size of the problem”, aiming at collecting both quantitative and qualitative information on 
the subject. This enquiry illustrates many of the difficulties in quantifying “the size of the 
problem” with any degree of precision, even if its results were, de facto, eventually used by the 
 
32 Impact Assessment, p. 14. 
33 Idem. 
34 Idem. 
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European Commission to put forward a set of relatively straightforward, factual-sounding 
assertions in the Impact Assessment.35  
The survey was carried out in October 2017 through an online questionnaire made available to 
representatives of public authorities. It is probably better understood as primarily a 
consultation tool, contributing to the exploration of experiences and perceptions among 
stakeholders. A total of 76 responses were received online, plus one via email, covering all 
Member States except Greece and Poland; 68 responses came from law enforcement, 5 from 
judicial authorities, and 4 from the public administration officials.36 
As explicitly noted by the European Commission, the survey focused on the collection of 
respondents’ estimates, as it was clear that relevant data as such are “not collected in Member 
States”.37 Thus, the survey did not seek to collect any quantitative input other than 
approximations or extrapolations shared by the respondents, presumably on the basis of their 
experience. 
4.2.1 Qualitative input contextualising quantitative answers 
Some estimations were indeed provided in the answers. A number of respondents, however, 
and in spite of making the effort of indeed completing the questionnaire, also manifestly and 
actively resisted the invitation to provide the estimations requested from them. This becomes 
is not particularly echoed in the Impact Assessment, but becomes more visible when analysing 
directly such answers.38  
A number of questions in the document prepared by the European Commission, indeed, were 
directly formulated as requests for estimates (“Please estimate the percentage of…”,39 “Please 
estimate the breakdown per type of data…”),40 and gave the possibility to respondents to either 
select between a series of ranges of percentages, or to pick up the option “I cannot estimate”, 
or “I cannot indicate”. When the latter answer was selected, respondents were encouraged to 
justify their choice in a subsequent question, with formulas such as “Please explain why you 
cannot estimate the percentage(s) of the previous question”.41 
 
35 This survey is designated as ‘target survey 2’ in the Impact Assessment. 
36 Impact assessment, p. 135.  
37 Ibid., p. 130. 
38 The questionnaire (‘Survey to public authorities on cross-border access to e-evidence’, Ref. Ares(2019)4117217 
- 28/06/2019) and the answers submitted online were made accessible by the European Commission following a 
request for public access to documents submitted in June 2019. The provided copy of the answers does not include 
personal details such as names or email addresses; it also does not contain information about the organisations 
of the respondents who did not consent to the publication of their organisation's information; all respondents 
were requested to declare that nothing within their responses was unlawful or would infringe the rights of any 
third party in a manner that would prevent publication. All respondents were informed via the questionnaire that 
“whatever option chosen… [y]our answers, excepting personal data, may be subject to a request for public access 
to documents under Regulation (EC) N°1049/2001”. 
39 For instance, Questions 10, 12, 16. 
40 For instance, Question 14. 
41 For instance, Questions 11, 13, 15, 17. 
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Some of the explanations provided by those who asserted it was not possible for them to share 
estimates include references to a lack of sufficient data about the phenomenon, including 
specific mentions of absence of detailed statistics,42 which confirms the initial premise of the 
European Commission. Some responses refer to a lack of personal, direct experience on the 
matters being surveyed, which indeed affects the usefulness of any attempts to estimate. 
Importantly, some respondents also question the very possibility of confidently providing any 
valid estimates, for instance in light of the fact that the issues about which they are questioned 
are highly case-dependent, and that realities might vary depending on the type of crime, the 
circumstances of the crime, and the type and volume of data requested, or more generally for 
considering that certain estimations “cannot seriously be rendered”.43 
Nevertheless, the claims that the Impact Assessment submits, on the specific grounds of this 
survey, include utterances such as the following: “More than half of total investigations include 
a request to cross-border access to e-evidence”, “Less than half of all the requests to service 
providers are fulfilled”, and “Almost two thirds of crimes involving cross-border access to e-
evidence cannot be effectively investigated or prosecuted”.44 Results of this survey, framed in 
these terms, were used for the section of the Impact Assessment which defines and assesses 
the “magnitude of the problem” allegedly justifying the legislative initiative.45 
In light of the fact that the survey was aiming at merely collecting estimates, as well as 
qualitative information on such but also the different insights gathered from respondents on 
the actual difficulty of providing reliable estimates, it appears necessary to insist on the 
relativity of findings such as those highlighted in the Impact Assessment, or at least to the need 
to qualify them more openly.  
4.2.2 Other readings 
The survey did lead to results such as those illustrated in the below table, which compares the 
success-rate of requests for non-content data addressed to service providers depending on 
whether data are requested through judicial cooperation channels or by asking directly for the 
data to the service provider.46 
 
42 “Cause we do not have records of such requests”, as expressed by one of the respondents. 
43 As stated in p. 62 of the document with answers provided by the EC. 
44 Impact Assessment, p. 130. 
45 Ibid. 
46 The figures used are those presented by the European Commission in Table 3, p. 16 of the Impact Assessment. 
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Table 1. Percentages of fulfilled requests (non-content data) 
 
 
As shown in this table, according to the survey’s results opting for requesting data directly to 
service providers does not increase the probability of the success of requests, on the contrary: 
requests for non-content data appear to be more effective when conducted through judicial 
cooperation channels in intra-EU scenarios, and just as effective as alternative solutions in 
scenarios involving extra-EU requests. 
The Impact Assessment did not provide enough information to make similar comparisons in 
relation to requests for content data. Respondents were strongly reluctant to provide any 
answers to a question about “the percentage of investigations where your request to a service 
provider located in a non-EU country is fulfilled”, in relation to content data from electronic 
communication services data and from other Internet or app-based services: almost 60%, on 
average, preferred not to give any estimated range of percentages about such investigations.47 
Taking into account the focal importance of facilitating access to content data across the 
Atlantic in the policy push for the E-evidence package and related developments, the fact that 
a majority of consulted national experts across the EU were unable and/or unwilling to share 
with the European Commission even an approximation as to what could be the size of this 
specific problem is, certainly, to be highlighted. 
 
47 The average percentage of answers “I cannot estimate” and absence of answers to these sub-questions of 
Question 57, on the basis of the answers provided online, is 57,89 %. 
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5. Final remarks 
Facilitating the access by public authorities to data held by private companies is, there is no 
doubt, high on the agenda of EU’s institutions. The mantra according to which the fight against 
crime requires faster and smoother access to more data has manifested in a variety of ways, 
and is currently mainly embodied in three different initiatives – the E-evidence package, the 
negotiation of an EU-US Agreement, and the participation in negotiations on a Second 
Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention.  
These three initiatives are concerned with ‘cross-border’ access to data, in ways to as a matter 
of fact allow for a certain re-configuration of how jurisdictional borders and data flows interact 
and mutually shape each other. 
Looking at the evidence beyond these developments, it surfaces that available information 
substantiating their necessity is fundamentally limited. Although this does not preclude as such 
that they might not be beneficial and useful to some extent, it renders particularly challenging 
the assessment of the strict necessity of any upcoming measures. More importantly, it renders 
extremely delicate any balancing between such – yet unquantified – need and the legal 
imperative to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals protected under EU 
law.   
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